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The right to know one’s genetic origins




The use of donor sperm or egg for reproduction raises the issue of the right of donor-conceived individuals to
know their genetic origins. This paper argues in favor of acknowledging such a right and explores the challenges
that cross-border medically assisted reproduction would raise in relation to it. It first explores possible justifications
for such a right by discerning its possible conceptual and empirical groundings. It describes some key ethical and
policy implications of the removal of donor anonymity. It then argues that novel technologies such as mitochondrial
replacement and gene editing raise new concerns in this area and may expand the scope of such a right. Finally, it
argues that while many barriers to accessing information about genetic origins already exist at national levels,
cross-border medically assisted reproduction may exacerbate a reality in which many individuals conceived
through third-party participation are deprived of information that may be crucial to their future well-being
for medical or psycho-social reasons.
Background
In their timely and important article “Ethics and Regulation
of Inter-country Medically Assisted Reproduction (MAR):
A Call for Action”, which was recently published in
the IJHPR, Carmel Shalev and her colleagues call for
international, national and professional attention to
the governance of cross-border MAR based on a human
rights framework, and suggest principles of good practice
[30]. This is a thoughtful contribution to a growing
bioethical debate surrounding the ethical and policy
challenges raised by the global expansion of assisted
reproduction and its consequences for the health and
well-being of all parties involved.
The article is a report of an inter-disciplinary working
group of experts that convened in Israel to discuss these
challenges, while dedicating particular attention to the
protection of the most vulnerable parties involved in
cross-border MAR, i.e. third party service providers and
the children conceived through these technologies and
interactions. While group members came to a consensus
on some key issues related to the way forward in this
complex arena, they report disagreement regarding
“whether or not children have a right to know the
identity of their genetic progenitors”. They agreed
that medical professionals have a legal obligation to
preserve identifying information about third-party col-
laborators, but not that those conceived have the
right to access this information.
This commentary takes a clear position in relation to
this point and argues that children conceived through
MAR are entitled to know their genetic origins, i.e. the
source of the egg or sperm used in their conception. I
will go further and argue that novel technologies such
as mitochondrial replacement and even gene editing
raise new concerns in this area and may expand the
scope of such a right. I will suggest that while many
barriers to accessing such information already exist at
national levels, cross-border MAR may exacerbate a
reality in which many individuals conceived through
third-party participation are deprived of information
that may be crucial to their future well-being for
medical or psycho-social reasons.
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The right to know one’s genetic origins: empirical
and conceptual considerations
Individuals conceived with the help of egg or sperm pro-
viders are raised by their social-legal parents and may or
may not know that another person was involved in their
conception. While disclosure of the circumstances of
conception is recommended by professional societies [2],
birth certificates do not indicate the involvement of a
third-party [6, 21]. Disclosure therefore remains the pre-
rogative of parents. Even when parents choose to disclose,
access to information regarding the gamete provider may
be impossible since anonymous donation is still the norm
in most countries and since donor records are often not
kept long-term. This clinical and regulatory reality has
provoked a heated ethical debate regarding the right of
donor-conceived individuals to have access to information
about their genetic origins [25].
What arguments underlie the concept of a right to
know one’s genetic origins? Two approaches can be
found in the bioethics literature [9]. The first is conse-
quentialist and is based on the notion that lack of such
knowledge harms donor-conceived individuals and that
such harm can be empirically assessed and demon-
strated. The second is conceptual and is based on the
idea that knowing is a basic human right and as such no
empirical support is required to demonstrate what harm
occurs when it is violated. I argue based on both ap-
proaches that individuals have a right to know their genetic
origins and that consequently, clinical or legal frameworks
that violate it are ethically unacceptable and should be
modified at both national and international levels.
The conceptual approach assumes that people have a
right to know their genetic origins regardless of the
availability of empirical data to show that lack of know-
ledge is harmful. To cite Warnock: “I cannot argue that
children who are told of their origins (…) are necessarily
happier, or better off in any way that can be estimated.
But I do believe that if they are not told, they are being
wrongly treated” [32]. While not all donor-conceived in-
dividuals may indeed suffer harm if their right to access
this information is violated, such violation deprives them
of the liberty to choose what meaning they assign to the
genetic components of their identity and relationships, a
choice others in society have. As such, I argue, this
significantly limits their autonomy [27].
The empirical approach argues that knowledge of one’s
genetic origins is essential for one’s physical and psycho-
social well-being and that consequently, lack of access to
this information constitutes actual harm. Some focus on
the medical aspects of such harm, showing that lack of
access poses medical risks and creates health disparities
between those who are donor-conceived and those who
are raised by genetically-related parents [26, 28]. Medical
genetic history is acknowledged as a crucial tool for
adopting appropriate preventive strategies, for enhancing
diagnostic capacity and for making informed reproduct-
ive decisions. Moreover, when parents choose not to dis-
close to their children that a third-party was involved,
these children make false assumptions about half of their
genetic history and are thus likely to make uninformed
medical decisions.
Others focus on the psycho-social aspects of such
harm, arguing that knowledge of genetic origins is im-
portant for the development of personal identity and
healthy family relationships and therefore violating this
right may result in complex identity issues, social chal-
lenges and psychological distress, sometimes described
as ‘genealogical bewilderment’ [17]. What underlies these
notions is the idea that knowing who we are requires
knowing how we came to be; that the understanding of
oneself requires knowledge of where one’s characteristics
and traits came from [19, 20].
It is extremely challenging to empirically assess the
claim that lack of access to information about genetic
origins leads to significant psycho-social harm [13].
Scant empirical research exists and data are inconclusive
[29]. A critical analysis of research evidence conducted
in 2012 showed that while most empirical studies have
methodological limitations (e.g. selection bias), they
“consistently report that most donor-conceived people
have an interest in securing information about their genetic
and biographical heritage”, concluding that “the evidence is
sufficiently robust to promote the implementation of
policies and practices that promote transparency and open-
ness in collaborative reproduction, thus reflecting the im-
portance of maximising future choices and opportunities
for donor-conceived people” [4].
Knowing one’s genetic origins: ethical and policy
implications
Arguments in favor of allowing donor-conceived individ-
uals access to their genetic origins raise numerous is-
sues. While fully addressing and discussing all of them
goes beyond the scope of this paper, this section will
briefly describe some of the key issues that are often
raised in the debate.
a/What is meant by a ‘right to know one’s genetic
origins’?
The notion of ‘knowing one’s origins’ is complex and
can have a variety of meanings for different people. The
right to know one’s genetic origins can thus be seen as
an umbrella term that covers at least three aspects: the
medical aspect, i.e. the right to know one’s full family
medical history and to know medically relevant genetic
information about the donor; the identity aspect, i.e. the
right to personal narrative information about the donor
that could assist offspring in completing the picture of
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their own identity; and the relational aspect, i.e. the right
to know the full identity of the donor in order to at-
tempt to establish a relationship with him or her [25].
Each of these aspects of the right involves a different
understanding of what it means to be ‘genetically related’
to another person: from a solely biological meaning to a
deeper psychological and even existential meaning. Each
one also implies different policies. The right to know
medical information can be addressed by keeping full
and updated donor medical records [26], while the right
to attempt a contact or a relationship requires disclosure
of full donor identity, as guaranteed for example by UK
law (HFEA website [15]).
b/How does a ‘right to know one’s genetic origins’ impact
other parties?
Allowing donor-conceived individuals access to informa-
tion about their genetic origins obviously has implications
for all other stakeholders. It means that the state carries a
responsibility to appropriately legislate in the area of fam-
ily law, to ensure donors do not carry parental liability
with regards to any children conceived through their gam-
etes. It means that the state or the industry (e.g. IVF
clinics, sperm banks, egg donation agencies) must main-
tain indefinitely registries or records containing all the
relevant information. It means that donors must be fully
informed about the implications of open-identity donation
and the fact that they are engaging in a potentially life-
long commitment to update their records and possibly to
meet some day with their genetic offspring. It also means
that parents need to be counselled and to consider ahead
of time the implications of allowing their children access
to such information and the impact this may have on their
family unit [18, 24, 25].
c/Should parents be forced to tell donor-conceived children
about the circumstances of their conception?
Securing access to information about genetic origins
does not guarantee that donor-conceived individuals in-
deed have the possibility of accessing it, unless they are
aware of the circumstances of their conception [10].
While in same-sex families the issue of gamete donation
arises naturally, for heterosexual parents disclosure is a
decision they have to make. Many families struggle with
this decision, even in jurisdictions that ban anonymous
donation. Studies show that the majority of parents
choose not to disclose, mentioning as reasons the wish
to protect the child from knowledge that is seen as dis-
ruptive, to hide the fact of infertility and protect against
negative social reactions, and to shield the relationship
with the genetically-unrelated parent [7, 12, 16]. This
reality raises the complex and multifaceted issue of the
right not only to have access to information, but also to
know the truth about one’s conception.
One proposed solution to this issue has been to mark
birth certificates in a way that would identify those born
through gamete donation. This solution, however, is still
seen by many as controversial, as it would “compromise
the privacy of donor-conceived individuals and/or that
of their parents” [6] and would intrude into the intricate
fabric of family dynamics. A more acceptable approach
is to endorse a culture of openness and acceptance,
to enhance educational efforts and to encourage par-
ents to disclose by providing them with counselling
and tools [2].
d/Does a legal ban on anonymous donation reduce the
number of donors?
The impact of banning anonymity on the number of
those willing to donate gametes is an ongoing concern
for those jurisdictions that consider adopting such a pol-
icy. Creating an acute shortage of donors is not in the
best interest of parents who need third-party assistance
in order to conceive. It is also not in the best interest of
IVF clinics who wish to appropriately address the needs
of their patients. Research regarding the impact of ban-
ning anonymity on the availability of gametes is ongoing.
Overall, to date, such research has shown that the
number of donors does decrease immediately following
a change in policy (i.e. adopting a policy that requires
open-identity donation), but also that after a period of
time the number of donors can be brought back to the
same level by using appropriate recruitment strategies
(Adams on Epsify, [1]), [11]. The profile of donors is
different in jurisdictions that ban anonymity, but the
numbers of donors can be maintained with campaigns
that appeal to altruistic motivations. It has been sug-
gested to use an evidence-based approach to the recruit-
ment of gamete donors that takes into consideration the
beliefs, attitudes and fears of potential donors [8].
National and cross-border barriers
While open-identity gamete donation is gradually be-
coming more prevalent, and while some countries have
even banned anonymity [5, 26], anonymous donation is
still widespread worldwide and even mandated in some
countries, such as Israel [31]. This reality is ethically
problematic considering the growing acknowledgement
that disclosure to children is recommended [2] and that
long-term record keeping is important to allow donor-
conceived individuals future access to information [29].
The absence in many countries of supportive legislation
and/or local registries to keep information about gamete
providers long-term creates barriers to future access to
this information. Local norms of practice may also con-
tribute to these barriers, as some clinics may not counsel
prospective parents regarding future discussions with their
donor-conceived children. Dearth of educational and
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informational resources in some countries may also
create barriers, as parents may lack knowledge regard-
ing the alternatives available to them or regarding how
to initiate these types of potentially sensitive conversa-
tions with their children.
While such barriers already exist at the national level,
cross-border MAR may exacerbate these challenges. For
example, a child conceived in one jurisdiction and born
in another may have additional barriers to accessing in-
formation about her gamete provider. Regulatory frame-
works may be different between the two jurisdictions, so
that even if she is born in a country that acknowledges
the right to access gamete provider information at the
age of majority, such as the UK, this information may be
kept in a country that does not, such as Israel. Beyond
such regulatory barriers, the mere geographic distance
may create a barrier to access, since long and costly
travel may be required. Finally, language barriers may
exist when attempting to find out what information can
be obtained, how to do so and in understanding the in-
formation if and when it is provided.
At the medical level, screening procedures for gamete
providers may differ between countries. Assuming that
one’s gamete provider has been screened for certain
genetic conditions or other elements of medical history
based on local norms, may mislead those conceived
with gametes originating from other places. This may
create additional medical risks due to false medical
assumptions [26].
Challenges raised by emerging technologies
In their paper, Shalev and colleagues acknowledge that
“the issues are here to stay, and will likely grow as new
business opportunities emerge to bring to the IMAR
market controversial technological innovations, such as
the recent developments of mitochondrial replacement
therapy, and whole genome sequencing or CRISPR-Cas9
(‘gene editing’) for embryos”. Indeed, in the case of the
right to know one’s genetic origins, emerging technologies
that may in the future become a part of MAR raise novel
challenges. I will discuss two examples of such technolo-
gies: mitochondrial replacement and gene editing.
Mitochondrial replacement is a technique that allows
women to avoid transmission of mitochondrial disease
to their children while still using their own eggs and
thus preserving their genetic relatedness to the child.
Mitochondria is found in the human cell and produces
the energy the cell requires. It contain 37 genes (out of a
total of about 30,000) that are currently believed to only
play a role related to mitochondrial function and not to
the phenotype of the future individual [23]. However,
mutations in these genes may result in serious or poten-
tially fatal diseases that currently have no treatment. To
prevent the transmission of these detrimental mutations,
scientists have proposed to use ‘healthy mitochondria’
from a donor egg to replace that of the intended mother,
while still using the mother’s nucleus, which contains
the DNA responsible for the genetic identity of the
future child. Since the resulting child would have DNA
from 3 people (genetic father and 2 women), this tech-
nique is often called “3-parent IVF” and has sparked a
heated ethical debate [3].
Since children born following mitochondrial replace-
ment would have DNA from 2 women, some have
expressed concerns regarding the child’s right to know
this technique was used and even the identity of the egg
provider, who could be described as a ‘mitochondrial
mother’. Arguments in favor of such a right to know
highlight the fact that the role mitochondrial DNA
(mtDNA) plays in development is still uncertain and that
there may be “a precautionary case for granting a right
to know: just in case it turns out that mtDNA has a
greater role biologically than we thought; or just in case
it turns out that MT‐conceived children have a strong
desire to know who their donor was” [22]. I argue that
in the absence of robust longitudinal data regarding the
consequences of mitochondrial replacement, it is in the
medical and psycho-social best interest of those con-
ceived to have access to information regarding their
mitochondria provider, as in the case of egg provision.
However, even in the UK, where anonymous gamete do-
nation is banned, the right to access information about
the mitochondrial donor has not been acknowledged.
Mitochondrial replacement is not currently used in
IVF clinics and is considered illegal in some countries,
such as Canada. In February 2015, the UK became the
first country in the world to allow by law clinical trials
with this technique. In September 2016, media world-
wide reported the birth in April 2015 of the first baby
boy conceived through mitochondrial replacement [14].
The IVF was performed for a Jordanian couple by an
American Doctor and took place in Mexico, where – to
quote the doctor – “there are no rules”. This is a clear
case of cross-border MAR performed in a less restrictive
jurisdiction to avoid limitations that exist in the home
countries of both doctor and patient. This case illus-
trates how cross-border MAR may complicate and even
hinder access to information about genetic origins. This
boy’s capacity to access information about his mitochon-
drial provider would have been limited and unprotected
by law even within national boundaries. When doctors
and parents travel to another jurisdiction to perform a
procedure using a technique that is banned in their
home countries, this capacity is significantly reduced.
On a more futuristic note, recent advances in gene
editing techniques, in particular CRISPR Cas-9, have
sparked an international debate surrounding the ethical
implications of germline editing, and the possibility of
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editing the genome of embryos in a way that would pro-
duce individuals whose DNA has been edited before
birth [33]. Many ethical arguments have been made, but
there is still no literature on the issue of whether a
genetically-edited individual would have the right to
know that her DNA has been edited, in what way and
for what purpose. A full argument in favor of a right to
know in this futuristic context is beyond the scope of
this commentary, but it is reasonable to argue that if
such a right is ever acknowledged, here again cross-
border MAR involving gene editing would make it more
difficult for those conceived to access this type of infor-
mation about their genetic origins. This issue also dem-
onstrates that Shalev and her colleagues are right to
point to emerging technologies as likely raising new
challenges in this area.
Conclusion
Cross-border MAR indeed raises numerous ethical and
policy concerns that need to be urgently addressed. I
argue that the right of those conceived through MAR to
have access to information regarding their genetic origins
is one key element that should inform ethically respon-
sible policies and best-practices that govern cross-border
MAR, in order to enhance the protection of the most
vulnerable parties. This aspect is of great importance at
the level of promoting medical interests, protecting future
autonomy and respecting human rights.
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